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The refugee regime' has undergone a radical transformation since
the end of the Cold War, dramatically altering opportunities and challenges for the realization of human rights. Some of the changes are
related to the Cold War itself. Others grow out of the contemporaneous
process of globalization' and individuation,' twin phenomena that radi*

J.D. Yale Law School 1988, Assistant Professor, Ohio Northern University, Claude

W. Pettit College of Law. Julie Mertus wishes to thank Deborah Anker, Pamela Goldberg,
Todd Howland, and Thomas Weiss for their suggestions; Katherine Guernsey and Barbara
Wilson for their research assistance; and the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program
and the Harvard Center for International Affairs for supporting this work. A monograph by
the author applying this model, "Assistance and Protection: The Gender Connection," will be
published in 1999 by the Humanitarianism and War Project, Watson Institute for International Affairs, Brown University.
1. The term "refugee regime" at one time referred only to those laws, policies and
practices set up to deal with "refugees" as defined by the 1951 Convention on Refugees. As
explained below, the regime has become enlarged in scope to cover all those uprooted in
war, including "war victims" (all victims regardless of movement) and "displaced people"
(those who are displaced from their homes but who remain within their state of origin) and,
in addition, the regime now includes many less formal systems and actors that interact with
and/or complement the original systems and mechanisms. As used in this essay, "refugee
regime" refers to the second, broader definition. Unless otherwise noted, the term "refugee"
is used throughout to apply to refugees and displaced people. See James C. Hathaway, A
Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L. J. 129
(1990).
2. Zdravko Mlinar has identified five dimensions of globalization: (1) globalization as
increasing interdependence at the world level, wherein the activities of people in specific
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cally transform the statist paradigm and the kinds of challenges encountered by those concerned with the human rights of refugees. These
developments are complex. We can say that the shift from a Cold War
refugee paradigm4 to a post-Cold War paradigm has occurred during a
time of globalization and individuation. At the same time, however,
globalization and individuation have accelerated as the Cold War has
deflated. Delineating cause and effect and pinpointing the exact moment
of intersections would be an impossible task. We can, however, identify
the attributes of this paradigm shift and, within it, locate challenges to
the statist paradigm. Through this analysis, we can better understand the
field in which human rights and refugee advocates operate and fashion
solutions to meet today's problems.
The statist paradigm and its critique have long been central to the
agenda of many international law and human rights scholars The
dominant approach to international organization, viewing states as the
primary unit of analysis and sovereignty as the primary measure safeareas have repercussions that go beyond local, regional or national borders; (2) globalization
as the expansion of domination and dependence, that is "an inter-connectedness on the
global scale, in which radial rather than laterallinks predominate"; (3) globalization as homogenization of the world wherein "instead of differences among territorial units which
were mutually exclusive, there is now a uniformity"; (4) globalization as diversification
within "territorial communities" wherein "the level of globalization can be measured by the
extent to which narrow territorial units are open and permit access to the wealth of diversity
of the world as a whole"; (5) globalization as a means of surmounting temporal discontinuities through "(a) connectedness of the asynchronous rhythms of different activities and (b)
temporal inclusiveness resulting from the functioning of particular services to global space
frames." Zdravko Mlinar, Individuation and Globalization; The Transformation of Territorial Social Organization, in GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES 15, 20-22
(Zdravko Mlinar ed., 1992); see also Richard Falk, Regionalism and World Order after the
Cold War, 1995 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L. J. 71-88.
3. By individuation, I refer to "the processes of increasing the autonomy and distinctiveness of the actors at both the collective and individual levels." Mlinar, supra note 2, at
15. Mlinar identifies the dimensions of individuation as: (1) the weakening of predetermination on the basis of origin; (2) the weakening of determination on the basis of territory; (3)
increasing the diversity of "time-space paths" (that is, not being limited to the role and position of individuals in space at a specific moment in time); (4) increasing control and decrease
of (random) intrusions from the external environment (wherein actors assert greater control
over the impulses from the environment); and (5) increased authenticity of the assertion of
identity (more direct assertion of identity without the use of intermediaries or representatives). Id.
4. The Cold War paradigm is similar to, but distinct from, the colonialist paradigm.
For example, colonialist donors may be more influenced by their desire to perpetuate their
culture on the other, see Cecilia Ruthstrom-Ruin, BEYOND EUROPE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
REFUGEE AID 132-135 (Bengt Ankarloo, Sven Tigil, et. al. eds., 1993) (discussing British
and French aid to African colonies). This essay will not equate the two, but will instead leave
discussion of the colonialist and post-colonialist refugee paradigms to another day.
5. With respect to security issues, the state is generally viewed as central. See G.
Sorensen, IndividualSecurity and NationalSecurity: The State Remains the Principle Problem, 27(4) SECURITY DIALOGUE 371 (1996).
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guarding state action within its territories,' has been re-examined, demythologized, and de-constructed This essay adds to the debate
through the examination of the refugee regime, an area in which states
and notions of sovereignty have always played an important role. It asks
two converse questions. First, how does the changed role of the state in
today's "globalized"' society affected the refugee regime? Second, how
does today's refugee regime re-figure the role of the state? This article
charts the paradigm shift in the refugee regime in the context of these
questions.
My thesis is that within the refugee regime the move away from
states and adherence to states are two sides of the same coin. To some
degree the new refugee regime reflects the trend away from both the
state and strict notions of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the new regime also
exposes the staying power of the statist paradigm. In many respects, the
role of states has indeed been altered, but states have retained their role
as important and often essential actors. While other observers have
commented on specific geographic or thematic changes in the refugee
regime,' this essay attempts to place the paradigm shift within a conceptual framework, and from this framework asks new questions about
the nature and future direction of refugee law and policy. These questions must be answered if we are to address protection and assistance
concerns of refugees.

See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
See, e.g., Luis E. LUGO, SOVEREIGNTY AT THE CROSSROADS? (1996); BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons & Michael
Mastanduno eds., 1995); Conference on Changing Notions of Sovereignty and the Role of
Private Actors in International Law, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L.& POL'Y 1 (1993); Christoper H.
Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigmfor International
Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447 (1993); Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty Is No
Longer Sacrosanct, 6 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95, 95-117 (1992); Martti Koskenniemi, The
Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 397 (1991); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty
and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990);
CONTENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY (R.B.J. Walker & S.H.
Medlovitz eds., 1990).
and text at __
8. For some of the attributes of globalization, see infra note __
9. See, e.g., The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN APPEAL, 1997-1998
(Oxford University Press 1997).
6.
7.
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FIGURE ONE: COLD-WAR PARADIGM

Sending States
"
"
"

the uprooted leave their
country of origin
refugees leave in order to
receive asylum
the uprooted go to states
with which they have
ideological affiliations (and
to nearby safe areas)

Receiving States

"

*

•

•

receiving states consider
those entering for asylum
(and temporary safe haven)
aid is delivered to refugees
in host countries or in asylum countries
cold-war strategy gives receiving states an incentive
to accept those with whom
they have ideological and
geopolitical affiliations/
interests
Although NGOs and GOs
may facilitate this process,
states are the main actors
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FIGURE Two: THE NEW REFUGEE REGIME

= Trans-sovereign actors. NGOs. IGOs

Receiving States

Sending States
"

the uprooted remain within
as internally displaced
" those that cross state lines
remain in a nearby state
(usually a traditionally
"sending-state")
" aid is delivered within the
country of origin and in
safe areas near the borders

*

measures are undertaken to
contain refugee flows and
to restrict asylum (and to
offer temporary safe haven)
* receiving states (which increasingly are not countries
of traditional asylum,) work
together and transsovereign actors-NGOs,
and IGOs-to deliver humanitarian aid and
development support.
" cross linkages appear between NGOs in receiving
and sending states
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A. The Post-Cold War Refugee Regime: A Shift
Away from the Statist Paradigm
1. Outlining the Cold-War, Statist Model
The classic, Cold War refugee regime was structured along statist
lines. It featured three primary types of actors: sending states, receiving
states, and refugees. (Figure One represents a simplified model of refugee and aid flows, and is further developed in the first column of Chart
A at the end of the essay). Under this model, state boundaries were tied
to the very definition of who was worthy of aid and protection.'° Further, the doors of receiving countries were to be open to "refugees,"
those persons outside their country of nationality who have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, as defined
by the 1951 United Nations Convention and its 1967 Protocol." Those
who did not fit the definition of persecution, who did not fall within the
limited persecution grounds, and who were uprooted" without having
crossed state boundaries-the internally displaced-had no recourse to
international legal protections and, for the most part, were denied any
assistance.'
The traditional approach to refugees was "reactive in the sense that
United Nations bodies, specifically the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), became interested in a
person or population only when they had become displaced, crossed a
border and sought asylum in another state."' 4 Action depended upon the
existence of an exiled refugee population desiring resettlement in another state. Sending states were usually paired with receiving states
based on ideological and geopolitical interests. Often the cause of uprootedness was linked directly or indirectly to Cold War struggles or, at
10. One of the best explanations of the development of this definition is found in ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG ET AL., ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN
THE DEVELOPING WORLD 3-29 (1989).

11. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, entered into force
April 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 50; see also Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Asylum: The Law and Politics of Change, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1 (1995).
12. This essay uses the term "uprooted" to refer to all people who are forced from their
homes or otherwise removed or "disrupted" during war. Thus, "uprooted" is a more inclusive
word than the legal term, "refugee."
13. For a review of the law of refugee status, see, for example, JAMES C. HATHAWAY,
THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (1991). Note that the most abundant group is nonconventional refugees who cross borders.
14. UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 1995: IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
30 (Oxford University Press 1995).
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the very least, political strategic concerns formed a potential state donor's response to uprootedness. In this game, the U.S. was most
concerned about its image with regard to the Soviet Union-enticing
Soviet scientists and artists to the shores of the U.S., for example, was
intended to make Soviet officials squirm." Receiving states had a reason to open their doors: a desire to siphon off refugees from those states
that supported the opposing ideology. Receiving countries could use
population flows "to discredit both the government or country of origin
and to bolster the image of countries granting them asylum." 6 In other
situations, Cold Warriors could "take advantage of refugee movements
by arming and training some of the people concerned and using them to
destabilize the government within their homeland."17
In the Cold War era, the locus of aid to refugees was usually in the
receiving country. There was considerable discussion of the human
rights abuses and political ideology that purportedly forced the refugees
to flee. Nonetheless, the "international community"" gave little thought
to foreign aid designed to contain refugee flows, or to developing or
reforming the sending country's infrastructure. Thus, the issue of the
receiving government giving its "consent" simply did not arise. 9 The
few Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") that did exist played a
limited role in the process, apart from carrying out their own government's concerns, and very few truly non-governmental links existed
between citizens' organizations and NGOs in sending and receiving
states. In short, aid of any type, including asylum, was linked to Cold
War foreign policy concerns.20
15. Boldizsar Nagy, Changing Trends, Enduring Questions Regarding Refugee Low in
Central Europe, in ISTVAN POGANY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE 185, 191 n.17

(1995) (citing 1953 National Security Council paper which stated explicitly that it was
American foreign policy "to encourage defection of all USSR nationals as well as of 'key'
personnel from the satellite countries" as this would inflict a "psychological blow on Communism").
16. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 37.
17. Id.(citing the examples of the Nicaraguan Contras in Honduras, the Afghan muja-

hideen in Pakistan, and the Namibian exiles in Angola).
18. Throughout this essay I use "international community" reluctantly as it has both no
meaning and the most precise meaning. International community refers to whatever the
reader thinks is the community that acts internationally. When speaking about the interna-

tional community's concern about human rights, for example, a western reader might call to
mind western powers debating western concepts. •
19. See, e.g., Christine Gray, Host State Consent and UN Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. (1996).

20. A review of the aid in this era is out of the scope of this essay. See generally JOAN
NELSON, AID, INFLUENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY (1968); G. Ohlin, The Evolution of Aid
Doctrine, in FOREIGN AID: SELECTED READINGS (Jagdish Bhagwati & Richard S. Eckaus
eds., 1970); ROBERT S. WALTERS, AMERICAN AND SOVIET AID: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

M.

(1970).
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2. The Shift Away from the State
The post-Cold War refugee regime illustrates a complicated shift
away from this state-centric model. (See Figure Two, above, and the
second column on Chart A). The clarity of Cold War rhetoric now dissolved, the regime has spun into an identity crisis. "In the post-cold war
years, as in the period after the first and second world wars, forced
population displacements have proven to be a prominent consequence of
the demise of old ideologies, the collapse of existing empires and the
formation of new states."' Today, refugees are often victims of violence
or natural disasters, not ideological persecution. Would-be receiving
states and donors can no longer tell whom they are supposed to help
based on clear-cut ideological grounds .12 Sending and receiving states
thus are no longer coupled together, and formerly opposing Cold War. 21
riors even find themselves on the same side of a donor equation.
Prejudice-such as racism and nativism-now factors more heavily into
asylum decisions than it did during the Cold War. 2' Receiving states talk
less about the human rights of the uprooted and more about their own
rights. For instance, they talk about their right to protect their own culture and standard of living from the foreign intruders 25 and about the
larger "security dimension. ,26
Large-scale displacements of people are increasingly perceived as
presenting regional and international security risks. In Bosnia, for example, return of refugees under the Dayton Peace Accord is considered
essential to long-term peace and stability in the Balkans. 21 Similarly, the
UNHCR has recognized that "it is impossible to understand the dynamics and dimensions of the current crisis [in the Great Lakes region of

21. UNHCR, supra note 9, at 1.
22. For an examination of changes in U.S. policy due to the end of the Cold War, see
Davalene Cooper, Note, Promised Land or Land of Broken Promises? PoliticalAsylum in
the United States, 76 Ky. L.J. 923 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Claire Messina, From Migrants to Refugees: Russian, Soviet and PostSoviet Migration, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 620 (1994).
24. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, To BE AN AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE
RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION

(1997);

IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI(Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); DALE T. KNOBEL,

IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES

AMERICA FOR THE AMERICANS: THE NATIVIST MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

(1996);

WALTER BENN MICHAELS, OUR AMERICA: NATIVISM, MODERNISM, AND PLURALISM (1995);
NATIVISM, DISCRIMINATION, AND IMAGES OF IMMIGRANT (George E. Pozzetta ed., 1991).

25. See, e.g., Deborah J. Bartz, The United States HIV Exclusion: Endangering Refugees' Human Rights, 17 HAMLINE L. REV. 155 (1993); Sarah N. Qureshi, Global Ostracism
of HIV-Positive Aliens: InternationalRestrictions Barring HIV-Positive Aliens, 19 MD. J.
INT'L

L. & TRADE 81 (1995).

26. See ADAM ROBERTS, HUMANITARIAN
27. UNHCR, supra note 9, at 3.

ACTION IN WAR

(1996).
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Africa] without reference to the long history of forced displacement in
the region."28
The crossing of international borders is not the reality for the vast
number of people who require protection from armed conflict today
who remain within state borders but are deemed to be internally displaced populations (IDPs).' 9 The internally displaced present new
protection and assistance dilemmas to human rights and humanitarian
organizations. 3° While the 1951 Refugee Convention and its protocol
may protect those who cross state boundaries, no international conventions exist to protect displaced persons or those otherwise imperiled by
war and, thus, this latter group of refugees is more susceptible to the
whims of individual states.3' Moreover, in the case of internally displaced people, the very government that caused the displacement often
has the primary responsibility for their protection, thus complicating
access and provision of protection and assistance." As Roberta Cohen
has observed:
Often [the internally displaced] are caught up in internal conflicts between their governments and opposing forces. Some of
the highest mortality rates ever recorded during humanitarian
emergencies have come from situations involving internally
displaced persons. There is ... no one international organization with responsibility for protection and assistance to the
internally displaced.33
Encampments of internally displaced people fall prey to direct
physical abuse from domestic military and paramilitary troops. For example, military forces slaughtered thousands of internally displaced
the camps.34
people at the Kibeho camp in Rwanda, in an effort to close
International laws and policies utterly failed to provide timely protection;

28. Id.
29. See generally FRANCIS

& ROBERTA COHEN, MASSES IN FLIGHT: THE GLOBAL
(1988).
30. See Humanitarianism and War Project, Protecting Human Rights in Complex Emergencies (forthcoming in 1999) (on file with author).
31. See Arthur Helton, Refugee Protection Under International Law, 1989 A.L.I. 2
DENG

CRISIS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

(1989).
32. See Elizabeth E. Ruddick, The Continuing Constraint of Sovereignty: International
Law, InternationalProtectionand the Internally Displaced, 77 B.U. L. REV. 429 (1997).
33. ROBERTA COHEN, REFUGEE AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN: A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE (1995).
34. See Joint Evaluation of the Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The InternationalResponse to Conflict and Genocide. Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management (1996).
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international organizations could only step in after the massacre to provide humanitarian assistance.35
Given today's population flows, donors are hard pressed to determine aid recipients simply by reference to those who cross state
boundaries; the criteria for aid now pertain more to need than to state
boundaries. 36 Amir Pasic and Thomas Weiss have observed this shift:
When the bounds of territory, authority, and identity-of borders,
political arrangements, and ethnic or national solidarities-are
both ambiguous and uncertain, they serve as poor guides for action. In other words, it is situations and not categories of victims
that should be addressed. Those suffering should receive attention in proportion to their needs whether or not they have been
displaced.37
Increasingly, at the Secretary General and/or the General Assembly
of the United Nations' request, the UNHCR extends its mandate to displaced persons and to war victims under their "good offices"
jurisdiction.38 For example, forty percent of the UNHCR-aid recipients
in the former Yugoslavia were classified as "war victims," not internally
displaced or refugees.39 Considering displaced people and war victims
together, approximately eighty-five percent of the UNHCR's budget for
the former Yugoslavia was allocated to populations outside its formal
mandate.n°
Thus, the locus of aid has changed. Now, the distribution of aid is
largely within the country of origin or in a nearby state. The number of
situations in which humanitarian aid may proceed with the state's consent is growing. 4' A state's arbitrary refusal to provide aid may be
considered an abus de droit and may be insufficient to prevent the United
Nations from acting. 42 In these cases, protection of the human rights of
humanitarian workers and aid recipients is of heightened concern.
35. See S. KLEINE-AHLBRANDT, THE PROTECTION GAP: THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE: THE CASE OF RWANDA (1996).
36. This is not to say that all who are in need receive aid. In Rwanda, for example, the
people who stayed were in great need, but they received very little.
37. Thomas G. Weiss & Amir Pasic, Reinventing UNHCR: EnterprisingHumanitarians
in the Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1995, 3 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 41,44 (1997).
38. See Francis M. Deng, Dealing with the Displaced:A Challenge to the International
Community, I GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 45, 45-48 (1995); Arthur C. Helton, Displacement and
Human Rights: Current Dilemmas in Refugee Protection, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 379, 381-382
(1994).
39. Weiss & Pasic, supra note 37, at 47.
40. Id.
41. See Richard Plender, The Legal Basis of InternationalJurisdictionto Act with Regard to the Internally Displaced,6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 345 (1994).
42. Id. at 356.
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Paramilitary troops from the Caucasus to the Great Lakes have deliberately targeted international human rights and humanitarian personnel.43
In some instances in today's intra-state warfare, intervention has proceeded regardless of state consent where either the Security Council
authorizes it,44 or no functioning government is firmly established.
New actors complicate this picture. Leading roles are now played
by actors which appear both above and below states-including NGOs,
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), private voluntary organizations
(PVOs), and other governmental and non-governmental entities. The
UNHCR often "subcontracts out" humanitarian services to these enti46
ties and to coalitions led by major powers and/or deployed entirely by
them.47 NGOs play an increasingly important role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example, NGOs channel about twenty-five
percent of U.S. assistance.4 "'In net terms, NGOs now 49collectively
transfer more resources to the South than the World Bank.'
The goals of NGOs differ greatly from states. And, as Richard Falk
observes:
[T]he agents of humanitarian intervention are now often actors
other than governments, especially transnational citizens associations, operating on a political logic that is shaped almost
exclusively by moral considerations-largely an ethos of responsibility and solidarity-that is very different from the
statist outlook that guides most governments when they are engaged in humanitarian missions.5 °
Although NGOs cannot obviate the need for the state, they may
provide essential services and aid, and they "create conditions that facilitate the formation of international institutions" and "reinforce the
43. See Humanitarianism and War Project, supra note 30.
44. See Fernando R. Teson, Collective HumanitarianIntervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.
323 (1996); David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizationsand Host-State
Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 209 (1996).
45. Intervention may also be permitted to protect human rights. See Thomas Weiss, Intervention: Whither the United Nations?, 17 WASH. U. L.Q. 106 (1994).
46. For an example of the UNHCR's use of a regional NGO, see Rachel Lostumbo, Tibetan Refugees in Nepal: From Established Settlements to Forcible Repatriation, 9 GEO.
IMMIGR.

L.J. 911 (1995).

47. Thomas G. Weiss, Rekindling Hope on U.N. Humanitarian Intervention, in
LEARNING FROM SOMALIA: THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 207
(Walter S. Clark & Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997).
48. Leon Gorenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical
Approaches and Dimensions, 16 THIRD WORLD Q. 365 (1995).
49. Id. at 37, quoting Mark Duffield, NGOs, Disaster Relief and Asset Transfer in the
Horn: PoliticalSurvival in a Permanent Emergency, 24 DEV. AND CHANGE 140 (1993).
50. Richard Falk, The Complexities of HumanitarianIntervention: A New World Order
Challenge, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491, 499 (1996).
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norms promoted by these institutions through public education as well
as through organized attempts to hold states accountable to [them]...
In this sense, NGOs can serve to promote human rights norms in the
humanitarian sphere. Yet, NGOs are a wild card. For the most part, they
are left free to operate unchecked by international law either because
such laws do not apply to them,52 or due to a lack of political will to
hold NGOs accountable. 3 As a result, the record of NGOs on protecting, promoting, and following human rights norms in the refugee field is
sketchy at best.
The cause of this uprooting has also changed in the post-Cold War
Model, reflecting a further shift away from the state. As in the Cold War
era, major refugee flows are "deeply rooted in the dominant geopolitical
institutions of the global system and are directly or indirectly related to
the conflict between the superpowers. '54 However, eruptions of violence
are more likely to be internal than interstate,55 involving competing
power struggles divided by ethnic or national56 loyalties. While conflicts
51.

JANIE LEATHERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL

SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS: CHALLENGING THE STATE IN A THREE-LEVEL GAME

OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION,

Working Paper Series 4 (South Bend, IN: Kroc Institute, Oct.

1993). At the same time, NGOs are also motivated by self-interest and, given that many
NGOs are directly or indirectly state-funded, they usually will not move too far from a donor's perspective.
52. NGOs have not generally been regarded as subjects of international law, but this
status is changing. See Stephen Hobe, Global Challenges to Statehood: The Increasingly
Important Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STD. 191, 199
(1997). See also ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES V. IKERRECHT 416
(1990); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 67-69 (1990).
53. Cf Eric Dannemaier, Democracy in Development: Toward a Legal Framework for
the Americas, 11 TUL. ENVTL L.J. 1, 10 (1997).
54. Michael J. Schultheis, Refugees in Africa: The Geopolitics of Forced Displacement,
32 AFR. STUD. REV. 3, 29 (1989).
55. J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and
the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT'L ORG. 107, 130 (1994).
56. My use of the term "national" here corresponds with the European usage signifying
a community brought together by real or imagined history, language and traditions. The
literature on nations and nationalisms is bountiful. For definitions of "nations," see generally
MONTSERRAT GUIBERNAU, NATIONALISMS: THE NATION-STATE AND NATIONALISM IN THE

(1996); Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity
and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT. L. 359 (1996); Lea Brilmayer, The
Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 7 (1995); John Hall, Nationalisms, Classifiedand Explained, in NOTIONS OF NATIONALISM 8 (Sukumar Periwal ed., 1995);
DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY (1995); ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM
IN A GLOBAL ERA (1995); ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1990);
PETER ALTER, NATIONALISM (1989); BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983); ERNEST GELLNER,
NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983); JOHN BREUILLY, NATIONALISM AND THE STATE (1982);
Definition and Classification of Minorities; Memorandum Submitted by the SecretaryGeneral, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/85.27 (1949).
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during the Cold War often reflected larger Cold War aims, these struggles are likely to concern secession, state formation, and intra-state
powerplays.57 States are often unable to control these conflicts." Paramilitary troops and leaders of ethno-national political groups play a
particularly potent role in the reshaped landscape; like NGOs, these
non-state actors are unlikely to be held accountable under international
law for human rights abuses.
In several of the recent conflicts, "mass population displacements
have not been simply a consequence of armed conflict, but have also
been the explicit objective of the warring parties." 59 Thus, "civilians are
often used as weapons and targets in warfare, and large-scale displace-6
ments comprise a political strategy in claiming control over territory." 0
Although Cold War powers used population displacement in their ideological struggles, the promotion of intra-group hatred and forced
movement of civilians in today's ethno-national conflicts is an end in
itself. "Unable to gain external support for their cause by exploiting rival superpowers, governments and other actors alike have resorted to
'playing the communal card,' a process which has often cumulated in
social violence and armed conflict.",6' Today's population movements
are "unusually large and speedy. 62 They are often accomplished
through gross human rights and humanitarian violations, including
"conspicuous atrocity, systematic rape, hostage-taking, forced starvation
and seige, the destruction of religious and historic monument, the use of
shells and rockets against civilian
targets ... and the use of land-mines
• 1 ,,61
to make large areas uninhabitable.
Where the state has "failed" 64 or "collapsed, 65 the nature of the conflict is not political in the traditional sense. Often there is no central
57. See

VALERY TISHKOV, ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND CONFLICT IN AND AFrER THE

274 (1997).
58. See e.g., Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the
Institution of the State, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 562 (1994).
59. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 22; see also Frederick B. Baer, InternationalRefugees as
PoliticalWeapons, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 243 (1996).
60. Gil Loescher, The InternationalRefugee Regime Stretched to the Limit?, 47 J. INT'L
SOVIET UNION: THE MIND AFLAME

AFF. 351,
SECURITY

363 (1994); see also GIL
268 (1992).

LOESCHER, REFUGEE MOVEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL

61. UNHCR, supra note 9, at 25 (citing Human Rights Watch, Playing the Communal
Card: Communal Violence and Human Rights (1995)).
62. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 23.
63. Mary Kaldor, A Cosmopolitan Response to New Wars, 8 PEACE REVIEW vol. 4

(1996); see also II

HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

(1993).

64. Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3,

20(1992).
65.

COLLAPSED STATES:

THE

DISINTEGRATION

AUTHORITY (I. William Zartman ed., 1995).

AND

RESTORATION

OF LEGITIMATE
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authority to which peacemakers may appeal for a solution. It is very
difficult for a country to get back on its feet without a strong international presence, including both military and humanitarian actors. That
being said, the presence of international and regional entities, which are
66
determined to re-member the state according to their own goals, may
contribute to the breakdown of sovereignty and to real and imagined
state control. Large-scale displacements of people in the post-Cold War
era have prompted individual state and regional organizations to intervene militarily in such countries as Albania, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, and
Yugoslavia.6 7 "Whether such action is taken with or without the consent
of the country concerned, and whether it is prompted by humanitarian or
strategic considerations, it inevitably has an 68important impact on the
local balance of political and military power.,
The shift to the post-Cold War refugee paradigm has occurred
within the context of globalization, a complex phenomenon which
pushes the refugee regime farther away from sole reliance on the state.
Some of the trends witnessed by globalization include:
• Increased interdependence of states, specifically in the areas
of trade and finance, security, technology and ecological
problems, and other issues which contribute to the causes and
solutions of uprootedness. 69
• Increased interconnectedness of states and individuals, facilitated by improved communication technology and
transportation, both of which break down the barriers between the 7"distant
other" and us, bringing their problems
°
back to us.
* Greater access to and participation in international, regional,
and national problem-solving by forces below the state, such
as NGOs7' and "new social movements with both local and
66. The Dayton Peace Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, represents an attempt
by the U.S. and other western powers to re-member Bosnia to suit their own goals. See Julie
Mertus, Prospects for National Minorities under the Dayton Accords-Lessons from History:
The Inter-War Minorities Schemes and the "Yugoslav Nations" (forthcoming book chapter
1997).
67. UNHCR, supra note 9, at 4.
68. Id.

69. See, e.g., TONY SPYBEY, GLOBALIZATION AND WORLD SOCIETY (1996).
70. There are fewer natural barriers to population movements today, thus facilitating
long-distance border crossing. See David A. Martin, The New Asylum Seekers, in THE NEW
ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980's 8 (David A. Martin ed., 1988).
71. See, e.g., Felice D. Gaer, Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN, in NGOs, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51-66 (Thomas G. Weiss &
Leon Gordenker eds., 1996); Peter Shapiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental
Organizations in International Decision Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 48 (1995); THO-
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transnational consciousness," 72 and by other groups which
may have an interest in issues related to humanitarian concerns.
*

Greater access to and participation in international, regional, and national problems solving by forces above the
state, such as transnational corporations, inter-governmental
organizations, and regional collective arrangements.73

•

Greater reliance on collective, transovereign solutions to
international and civil armed conflict, human rights violations, natural and man-made ecological disasters (including
ecological degradation) 74 and other factors that lead to and
accompany population displacement.75
76

*

Enhanced "cross linkages" among actors, which allow individuals and NGOs direct access to NGOs in other states,
and to regional and international systems and mechanisms.77
All of the above factors work to decentralize the state in the refugee
regime and to elevate the role of other actors.
In this era of globalization there is "less deference by the international community and other participants in the international system to
MAS PRINCEN AND MATTHIAS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL

NGOs

IN WORLD POLITICS

(1994);

JOHN CLARK, DEMOCRATIZING DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS,

(1991).

72.

JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? 3 (1992).
73. See Anthony G. McGrew, Conceptualizing Global Politics, in GLOBAL POLITICS:
GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION STATE 1, 1-30 (Anthony G. McGrew & Paul G. Lewis et
al. eds., 1992).
74. See, e.g., Jessica B Cooper, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of
the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480 (1998).
75. Other factors may include political, economic and social restructuring in the countries of origin and/or on an international level which causes famine, joblessness,
homelessness and other problems of survival.
76. The term "cross-linkages" is drawn from Chadwick F. Alger, Local Responses to
Global Intrusions, in GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES 77 (Zdravko Mlinar ed.,
1992). One of the most successful examples of cross linkages is in the environmental arena.
See, e.g., Ken Conca, Greening the UN: Environmental Organizationsand the UN System, in
NGOs, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, at 103-20; Maria Garner, Note,
Transnational Alignment of Nongovernmental Organizations for Global Environmental
Action, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1057, 1077 (1991). In the field of women's human
rights, see, for example, Martha Alter Chen, Engendering World Conferences: The International Women's Movement and the UN, in NGOs, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
supra note 71, at 139-58; Julie Mertus & Pamela Goldberg, A Perspective on Women and
InternationalHuman Rights After the Vienna Declaration:The Inside/Outside Construct, 26
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 201 (1994).
77. See, e.g., Peter Sollis, Partners in Development? The State, NGOs, and the UN in
Central America, in NGOs, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 71, at 139-58;.
see also, Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The
Emerging Role of InternationalCivil Society, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 107 (1996).
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the mystique of state sovereignty and claims of domestic jurisdiction,
and a greater willingness to assert and enforce broadly agreed international community policies, interests and values, such as those
concerning human rights."" For the refugee regime, this means a greater
willingness of international actors to interfere in events taking place
within a country, especially when they present matters of humanitarian
concern.79 The behavior of actors in the post-Cold War paradigm thus
becomes less "sovereignty-bound" and more "sovereignty-free." 0 Both
traditional actors-states-and new actors-NGOs and other transsovereign forces-often act without regard to traditional notions of
statehood .
Refugee law and policy thus must adapt to a new environment in
which states play a new and often less crucial role than they had played
during the Cold War. It would be a mistake, however, to say that states
have totally disappeared from the paradigm. As explained below, the
refugee regime, and the organizations and entities that operate within it,
still must pay heed to the wishes of states.
B. The Post-Cold War Refugee Regime: A Soured Statist Paradigm

States still exercise great control over the needs of the uprooted.
What do the uprooted want? In the immediate stage, "protection traditionally means life-saving interventions, fair treatment upon reception,
compliance with essential humanitarian standards and non-return to a
place of prospective persecution (non-refoulement)."8 2 Later, however,
they want something more: either a safe return home or the start of a
new life." Ultimately, they want the root cause of the problem addressed so that it never happens again. 84 In all three of these stages,
78. Richard B. Bilder, Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: An American Viewpoint, 20 CAN. U.S. L. J. 9, 16 (1994).
79. UNHCR recognizes that the decline of sovereignty is less clear when military intervention is concerned. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 39.
80. This terminology is drawn from Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss, Pluralizing
Global Governance: Analytic Approaches and Dimensions, 16 THIRD W. Q. 357, 360

(1995).
81. See e.g., Arthur C. Helton, The Legality of Providing Humanitarian Assistance
Without the Consent of the Sovereign, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 373 (1992).
82. Arthur C. Helton, UNHCR and Protection in the 90s, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 1-2
(1994); see also NORMAN MYERS, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES 150 (1995).
83. See JULIE MERTUS ET AL., THE SUITCASE: REFUGEE VOICES FROM BOSNIA AND
CROATIA (1997); RECONSTRUCTING LIVES, RECAPTURING MEANING: REFUGEE IDENTITY,
GENDER AND CULTURE CHANGE (Linda A. Camio & Ruth M. Krulfeld eds., 1994).
84. See Samuel 0. Gyandoh, Jr., Human Rights and Governance in Africa, 10 TEMPLE
INT'L & COMp. L.J. 265 (1996) (reviewing the statement "[w]hether or not most of them
would be able to phrase it in our legal terminology, African refugees want their human rights
restored in their host countries.").
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addressing the needs of the uprooted entails the protection and promotion of human rights. For example, the rights to life and freedom from
violence are often threatened during flight, in refugee camps, upon resettlement to a third country, -and upon return to the home country.
Under the current refugee regime, the state is still necessary for addressing such human-rights concerns. States increasingly cannot or will
not free themselves to do so, and non-state actors make attempts with
varying degrees of success."
As a rule, the greater the state involvement with uprooted persons,
the more rights potentially become available." Uprooted people in a
refugee camps or "safe areas" have few rights, de jure or de facto. They
may not be able to travel, to work, to be educated, or to reunite with
their family members. Although an international body can provide an
uprooted person with "temporary protection" in a refugee camp in the
middle of nowhere (or in an area in conflict), only a state can grant
asylum and the rights necessary to start life anew. The 1967 United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum recognized that when a state
grants asylum, it is exercising its sovereignty." Adhering to this definition of sovereignty, states maintain a resolute grip over asylum
decisions. As Eduardo Arboleda and Ian Hoy observe, states are unlikely to relinquish control over these matters: "Whether we like it or
not, it is not to be expected that states will enter into an agreement that
would eliminate their right to determine whom they admit within their
borders.""8
In terms of their legal status and rights under domestic and international law, distinctions can be drawn among the internally displaced,
retirees, asylum seekers, and stateless people. "[I]n terms of their human
needs and the humanitarian issues associated with their plight .... [these
groups] share a number of important characteristics."89 States refuse to
relinquish their right to make legal status determinations, but at the
same time, states shrink from their responsibility to address such determinations as human needs of the uprooted. This dilemma is drawn out
in three interrelated areas: state refusal to grant asylum; the international
community's move from protection to containment; and the move of
85. See, e.g.,

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNCERTAIN REFUGE: INTERNATIONAL FAILURES

Report 9/1, (1997).
86. I am indebted to Pamela Goldberg for this formulation.
87. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 12-13 (1980); see Joan Fitzpatrick,
Flight from Asylum: Trend Toward Temporary "Refuge" and Local Responses to Forced
Migrations, VA. J. INT'L L. 13 (1994).
88. Eduardo Arboleda & Ian Hoy, The Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of InterpretationandApplication, 5 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 66, 89 (1993).
89. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 6.
TO PROTECT REFUGEES,
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states and the international community from durable to temporary solutions. Each of these will be considered in turn.
1. State Refusal to Grant Asylum
Western countries view today's uprooted as burdens to avoid, not as
populations to be welcomed. Unlike the Cold War refugees, these new
arrivals are nonstrategic. B.S. Chimni draws the connection directly,
"with the end of the Cold War the firm basis of interest in refugees,
particularly from the developing world, has been removed: refugees no
longer have ideological or geopolitical value." 0 Would-be receiving
states face economic declines and rising xenophobia, racism, antiSemitism, and nativism. 9' In closing their borders, states are concerned
about the economic burden of new arrivals and the ways in which they
will exacerbate already existing racial, ethnic, and national tensions.
Not surprisingly, while the number of asylum-seekers has skyrocketed over the past ten years, fewer and fewer of the uprooted
successfully navigate the asylum process. The number of asylum seekers in Europe, North America, and Australia increased from 90,444 in
1983 to over 825,000 ten years later.92 Between ten and twenty percent
of all asylum seekers in Europe are accepted, a decrease from fifty percent in the mid-1980s. 93

90. B.S. Chimni, The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation,5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 443,444 (1993).
91. For a discussion of nativism and the rise of the new right in Europe, see, for exam-

ple,

THE FAR RIGHT IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE

TOMISLAV

(1990);

SUNIc,

AGAINST

DEMOCRACY

AND

(Luciano Cheles et al.
eds., 1995);

EQUALITY:

THE EUROPEAN NEW RIGHT
HERMANN KURTHEN ET AL., ANTISEMITISM AND XENOPHOBIA IN GERMANY AFTER

UNIFICATION

(1997);

NEW XENOPHOBIA IN EUROPE

(Bemd Baumgartl & Adrian Favel eds.,

1995); FASCIST EUROPE: THE RISE OF RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA (Glyn Ford ed., 1992).
92. Charles B. Keely & Sharon Stanton Russell, Responses of Industrialized Countries
to Asylum Seekers, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 399 (1994).
93. MARK GIBNEY, Refugees and Immigrants in the New Europe, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE NEW EUROPE: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 157, 160 (David Forsythe ed., 1994); see also
JOHAN CELS, Responses of European States to De Facto Refugees, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

187 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1990); Colleen V. Thouez,

New Directions in Refugee Protection, 22 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 89, 92 (1998)
("Germany in 1993 modified what had been Europe's most generous asylum laws to reduce
the number of refugees seeking asylum. Public pressure and high unemployment levels are
leading to changes in the law to deny asylum-seekers the right to work in Germany, for instance, while their claim is being processed"); ForeignAsylum Seekers in Germany Decline,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR,

Apr. 4, 1996 (noticing that the tightening of restrictions led to

a sixty percent decline in the number of refugees seeking political asylum in Germany between 1993 and 1994 and that in 1995, the successful asylum application rate was only nine
percent).
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Denial for asylum can take three forms. 94 First, would-be receiving
states can undertake direct measures aimed at preventing specific
groups of people from crossing borders.9 States may physically turn
asylum-seekers back before they cross the frontier, 96 0r detain them outside state territory where domestic laws and human rights standards may
not be applicable, as some have unconvincingly argued. 97 Second, states
can implement indirect measures that make crossing the border more
9
98
difficult, such as visa requirements, carrier sanctions," and the granting of great discretion to border guards. In her exhaustive study of such
procedures in Western Europe, Maryellen Fullerton notes that this latter
factor is quite significant as the "snap decisions of border guards and
airline personnel are virtually unreviewable."' ° Raising due process
concerns she notes:
The lack of an adequate record of the initial decision, the inability to obtain legal assistance, and the time pressures that
prevent gathering evidence to support further the asylumseeker's claim ensure that any appeal that is permitted fails to
provide a meaningful opportunity for review.... Such inade-

quate and unfair procedures necessarily will result in a number
of erroneous decisions.' °0

94. See Subrata Roy Chowdhury, A Response to the Refugee Problems in Post Cold
War Era: Some Existing and Emerging Norms of InternationalLaw, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L.

100, 102 (1995).
95. See, e.g., Thouez, supra note 93, at 89-90 ("Western receiving states are adopting
highly restrictive measures to curtail and, to a large extent, restrict the future entry of refuSignificant trends in migration policy include highly
gees and asylum-seekers ....
restrictive measures being implemented both at the national and inter-governmental levels,
and the general recognition that temporary asylum in the past leads to permanent settlement
in the future").
96. One infamous recent example of this is the U.S. coast guard summarily turning back
boats of refugees from Haiti. See Robert Maguire et al., Haiti Held Hostage: International
Responses to the Quest for Nationhood 1986 to 1996, Thomas J. Watson Institute for Inter-

national Studies and the United Nations University, Occasional Paper #23 (1996).
97. I say "not considered to be" because some commentators (including myself) would
argue that some basic human rights standards are always applicable. See Chowdhury, supra
note 94, at 100.
98. For example, all EU states imposed a visa requirement on would-be refugees from
Bosnia and Serbia. See Jacqueline Bhabha, European Harmonization of Asylum Policy: A
Flawed Process, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 101, 105 (1994).
99. See Erika Feller, CarrierSanctions and International Law, I INT'L J. REFUGEE L.

48, 66 (1989).
100. Maryellen Fullerton, Restricting the Flow of Asylum Seekers in Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands: New Challenges to the
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 33, 113 (1988).

101. Id.
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Finally, in order to dissuade refugees from advancing upon their
borders, states may lower the standards of treatment for refugees within
the host country. For example, states routinely deny refugees the right to
work, to education, housing and social welfare, as well as their right to
family reunification. 102
For the tightly packed Western European states, "there has been
something akin to a 'trump thy neighbor' phenomenon because nations
do not want to appear to have asylum procedures and policies that are
perceived by asylum seekers to be more liberal than those of other
states, and that might then serve to attract additional migrants."'' 3 States
have used bilateral and multilateral agreements as mechanisms for
dealing with the unwanted flow of asylum seekers. For example, Germany has negotiated agreements with Poland and Hungary permitting
rejection of asylum applicants at the border if they have passed through
a "safe country," defined as "a country that has an asylum process that
meets international standards and is not itself a source of asylum seekers." °4 Other European Agreements designed to specify strict rules for
adjudicating asylum applications include the Dublin Convention and
The Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement.' °5
Such international and regional arrangements 106 on asylum policy
have not triggered a turn away from state sovereignty. Jacqueline
Bhabha noted with respect to European harmonization of refugee policy
that "[g]enerally, agreement and meaningful steps toward common policy have only occurred in the piecemeal adoption of restrictive measures
102. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 11,at 8.
[T]he Convention's capacity for narrow or restrictive interpretation in the highly
structured environments of case by case adjudication leaves thousands "outside"
or "beyond" protection. They become the objects of ad hoc, discretionary and extra-legal policies that finally benefit no one. Individuals are commonly denied
even basic rights, or any opportunity to contribute to their own solution.
Id.; see also Chowdhury, supra note 94, at 102.
103. Gibney, supra note 93, at 162.
104. Charles B. Keely & Sharon Stanton Russell, Responses of IndustrializedCountries
to Asylum Seekers, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 399, 405 (1994); see Alberto Achermann & Mario Gattikere, Safe Third Countries:European Developments, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 19 (1995); Eva
Kjaergaard, The Concept of "Safe Third Country" in ContemporaryEuropean Refugee Law,

6

INT'L J. REFUGEE

L. 649, 650-51 (1994).

105. The Convention Determining the State Responsibility for Examining Applications
for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Community [the Dublin
Convention] was signed on June 15, 1990 by twelve members of the European Community.
The Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement was signed by nine E.C. countries in
1985 and implemented on March 26, 1995. See Gerald L. Neuman, Buffer Zones Against
Refugees: Dublin, Schengen, and the German Asylum Agreement, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 503,
506 (1993). See generally Alberto Achermann & Mario Gattiker, Safe Third Countries:
European Developments, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 19 (1995).
106. Sie Bhabha, supra note 98, at 101.
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which have involved no ceding of sovereignty or reduction in powers of
control."' 0 7 Even after these agreements, there is neither a uniform definition of refugee, nor a common set of procedures for processing
applications or for instituting appeal rights within Europe. ' °8 Far from
indicating an abrogation of sovereignty, these agreements indicate the
persistence of states' practice of restricting asylum.
2. The International Community's Move from Protection
to Containment
The international community has conspired with powerful would-be
receiving states against the uprooted by tacitly joining the campaign
against asylum seekers in Europe.' 9 For example, Germany and its
neighbors are allies in the "Fortress Europe" by coordinating their restrictive policies against refugees." 0 Instead of emphasizing protection
of the uprooted, the international community now trumpets containment-the localization of the problem and restriction of the flow of
humanity. The trend toward localization is evident in numerous responses which attempt to keep would-be refugees within their country
of origin or neatly packed into border areas of the international countries' own choosing. Interestingly, the UNHCR has made a concerted
effort to frame its new policy in terms of an effort to address the root
cause of population flows."' In 1992, the High Commissioner declared:
There now exists an urgent need to explore new, complementary protection strategies ... that ... rest on activities
principally in the fields of prevention and solutions to refugee
problems and depend on an early clarification of the parameinvolvement, particularly inside the country
ters of UNHCR's
2
of origin.1

107. Id.
108. Id. at 109.

109.

UNHCR AT 40: REFUGEE
129 (1991); see also Thouez, supra note 93, at 89.

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,

TION AT THE CROSSROADS

PROTEC-

110. Id. at90.
ll1. See The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, InterOffice Memorandum, No. 78/92, The Report of the UNHCR Working Group on International
Protection (Geneva: UNHCR, July 31, 1992).
112. Note on International Protection, Submitted by the High Commissioner to the
43rd Sess. of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/799 5 (1992), reprintedin 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 563 (1992).
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In practice, the UNHCR's policy has less to do with root causes
than it does with keeping refugees in their place-that is, far from the
borders of would-be receiving states in the Western world.'13
Rather than creating new options for uprooted persons, the new focus on containment has served to prevent them from meeting their
needs. The case of Bosnia exemplifies the way in which the UNHCR
program of "humanitarian action" limited opportunities for the uprooted
while nevertheless supporting would-be receiving states' non-admission
policies.' "4 One example of this, Guy Goodwin-Gill suggests, is the
UNHCR facilitation of persons leaving Bosnia and passing through the
sector of Krajina [then Serb controlled] into Croatia proper:
The tight control over departures, coupled with the extent of organization and the emphasis of documentation, meant that there
was no spontaneous movement of persons in search of refuge.
Clearly, many who wanted or needed to leave Bosnia never
made it to the crossing point at the Stara Gradiska bridge. Here,
UNHCR's involvement served as tacit endorsement of
"organized flight," undermining the individual right to seek
asylum, by effectively limiting the opportunities for exit.'"
For the uprooted, the UNHCR's self-declared "humanitarianism"
limits choices of exit, restricts rights to movement, and creates roadblocks to starting a new life in a new land when conditions back home
are too unsafe to return.
With its blessing, the international community now regards human
"holding zones" as an acceptable alternative to traditional protection.
For example, when Turkey refused asylum to thousands of Kurds after
the Persian-Gulf war, the international community reacted by moving
the Kurds into a U.N.-protected zone in Iraq."' While the international
community did not condemn Turkey for failing to abide by its sovereign
responsibilities to grant a right to seek asylum, the international community did instruct Iraq to allow immediate access to international
humanitarian organizations. Although Iraq initially objected to the
113. Andrew Shacknove makes this distinction between programs to address root
causes and containment. Andrew Shacknove, From Asylum to Containment, 5 INT'L J.
REFUGEE

L. 516 (1993).

114. See M. Barutciski, The Reinforcement of Non-Admission Policies and the Subversion of UNHCR: Displacement and Internal Assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-94), 8
INT'L

J.

REFUGEE

L. 49 (1996).

115. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Refugee Identity and the Fading Prospect of International

Protection (1996) (conference paper on file with author).
116. See Michael E. Harrington, OperationProvide Comfort: A Perspective in International Law, 8 CONN. J. INT. L. 635 (1993); Howard Adelman, HumanitarianIntervention:
The Case of the Kurds, 4 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1,4-5 (1992).
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measure as a violation of its sovereignty, it eventually concluded a
Memorandum of Understanding authorizing U.N. access to the "safe
havens" "-a predecessor to the "safe havens" that failed to protect displaced people in Bosnia-Herzegovina."' In Bosnia, "safe havens" were
kept under siege by combatants and manipulated by the warring factions
for their long and short term needs.
Similarly, "secondary states" are rapidly becoming popular as
holding reservoirs for those to whom the U.S. and Western Europe have
closed their gates. Apart from the simple desire to keep the uprooted out
of their own domestic arena, some would-be receiving states have a
strategic interest in keeping them close to their country of origin. Many
uprooted individuals, by merely belonging to one ethnic/national group
or another, are linked to the political struggles that caused them to flee.
Just as the warring parties used for their own gain the displacement of
people, the international community uses for their own ends the containment of people." 9
Donor governments may also have a vested interest in when and
how refugee populations return. In some cases, donor governments prefer that the flight causing conflict not end too soon. They would prefer a
victory for the side favored by the donor government, or at least humiliation and devastation for the side(s) disparaged by the donor. 2 °
Dennis Gallagher explains this phenomenon by way of example:
Western powers wished to prolong the debilitating effects of the
communist-led Eritrean and Tigrean liberation struggles over
the Ethiopian government, although they. did not care whether
these movements ultimately succeeded. Donor governments
supported refugee programs in neighboring Sudan that provided
safe havens for large numbers of Eritreans and Tigreans. Governments, on a clandestine basis, also secretly provided the
117.

HELENA COOK, THE SAFE HAVEN IN NORTHERN IRAQ : INTERNATIONAL RESPON-

(1995).
118. See LARRY MINEAR ET AL., HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
THE U.N.'s ROLE, 1991-1993 (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Institute for InternaSIBILITY FOR IRAQI KURDISTAN

tional Studies; Washington, DC: Refugee Policy Group 1994); AGE EKNES, BLUE HELMETS
IN A BLOWN MISSION?: UNPROFOR IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, ed., 1993).
119. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 37 (citing the examples of the Nicaraguan Contras in

Honduras, the Afghan mujahideen in Pakistan, and the Namibian exiles in Angola).
120. The sides include not only the warring parties but also their supporters. Western

governments were most interested in delivering aid to refugees from Afghanistan as long as
the Soviet Union was directly or indirectly involved in the war. "At the very least, they were
interested in making the USSR pay as much as possible-militarily, politically and financially-for the occupation." Dennis Gallagher, Durable Solutions in a New PoliticalEra, 47
J. INT'L AFF. 433 (1994).
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humanitarian arms of these liberation movements with relief
aid, which was transported, from 1Sudan
into Eritrean- and Ti21
grean-controlled areas of Ethiopia.
In like manner, donor governments can use refugee camps in border
areas as camouflage for providing "their side" with aid. Although similar manipulation of refugee populations occurred during the Cold War,
today it is122less clear who is supporting guerrilla groups in refugee camps
and why.
Thus, the retreat from protectionism not only helps states avoid an
influx of unwanted peoples, but it also serves their strategic purposes.
By supporting containment, the international community aids wouldbe receiving states in achieving their goals. For refugees, however, incountry protection and border-area holding camps are no solution."'
"[T]hose people who attempt to take refuge in a neighbouring or
nearby state increasingly find
that they simply swapped one situation
24
of insecurity with another."'
3. From Durable Solutions to a Temporary Arrangement or Repatriation
Three "durable solutions" to refugee crises are usually considered:
voluntary repatriation, local integration into the country of asylum, and
resettlement in a third country. With the doors of would-be receiving
states tightly closed, attention has turned to imposed re-settlement in
near-by countries and, in particular, to financial contributions to "first
asylum" •states
(meaning, keeping African refugees in near-by African
\125
countries).
Alternatively, if the refugees have made it to Western
countries, the goal becomes a temporary arrangement and/or the repatriation of refugees.
The vast majority of those denied refugee status under the 1951
Refugee Convention are allowed to remain in host states on humanitar-

121.

Id. See also GAIM KIBREAB, REFUGEES AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: THE CASE
(1987).
122. For the ways in which humanitarian aid can exacerbate conflicts, see MICHAEL

OF ERITREA

MAREN, THE ROAD TO HELL: THE RAVAGING EFFECTS OF FOREIGN AID AND INTERNATIONAL CHARITY (1997); JOHN PRENDERGAST, FRONTLINE DIPLOMACY: HUMANITARIAN AID

(1996).
123. Cf. James C. Hathaway, New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion
of the PalliativeRole of Refugee Protection,8 J. REFUGEE STUD. 288, 292 (1995).
124. UNHCR, supra note 9, at 5.
125. Given space limitations, this option is not discussed here. See B.E. HARRELLBOND, IMPOSING AID: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES 27 (1986) (demonstrating that
"while human societies everywhere are able to adapt, and that migration and resettlement
AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

may be one method, the imposition of these solutions, denying as it does fundamental human
rights, create more problems than they solve.").
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ian grounds,26 and are thereby granted a status known variously as
"leave to remain" or "humanitarian status."'' 27 However, conflicting
messages are sent to asylum seekers and the asylum-providing public.
The denial of asylum applications sends a message to the general public
that the claims made by the new arrivals are not warranted; that these
people do not have a well-founded fear of persecution, they just want to
improve their lives. 128 The message to would-be asylum-seekers is that
border, as the country will be reluctant
one must simply make it over the
129
to return them once they arrive.
Given state reluctance to grant asylum, various forms of temporary
protection have become "the link between non-refoulement [the obligation to not send those in flight back to a place in which they would be
endangered] and a durable solution."'3 ° There are three purposes behind
temporary protection:
(1) To save administrative and economic resources through the
absence of a full asylum procedure assessing individual claims,
but applying a prima facie group determination. (2) Politically it
becomes easier to return the refugee if the situation in the
country of origin changes, for then it is not a question of withdrawing a residence permit but rather of not renewing it. In this
way, a state sends a signal to the refugee that his or her stay in
the specific country is only temporary. (3) Finally, the state
sends a signal to the public at large that this refugee situation is
purely a matter of protection with no elements of voluntary migration. 3 '
All of these purposes serve the interests of the receiving countries
while neglecting the needs of the uprooted. The uprooted cannot last in
a holding pattern forever. After a while, they want to get on with their
lives, to return home, or start a new life in a new country. Temporary
protection denies these needs.
The goal of temporary protection is to treat the uprooted minimally
well, lest they cause civil unrest in their new country, but not too well,
so that they "keep[] his or her mind open to the possibility of returning
126. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 121.
127. GIBNEY, supra note 93, at 157, 160; see also Johan Cels, Responses of European
States to De Facto Refugees, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Gil Loescher &

Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
128. Deborah Anker, MischaracterizedAsylum Crisis Lydio, in 19 IN DEFENSE
149, 150 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1997).
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home."' 112 The ways in which governments prevent the temporarily protected from becoming too comfortable varies from country to country.
In particular, the right to work and the right to family reunion, access to
education, and the amount of social and relief payments may differ from
that accorded to other foreigners in the country. Moreover, no country
33
will issue travel documents to those under temporary protection. 1
After or instead of temporary protection, many states seek to repatriate refugees, often with the assistance of the UNHCR. Since the
1980s, the UNHCR has recognized "voluntary repatriation as the preferred solution to refugee problems."'' 34 This often boils down to
returning refugees into areas still in conflict. 35 These practices threaten
to violate the principle of non-refoulement.13 The pre-conditions for the
participation of the U.N., states, or other actors in voluntary repatriation
should include such factors as "fundamental change of circumstances,
voluntary nature of the decision to return, tripartite agreements between
the state of origin, the host state and UNHCR, and return in safety and
dignity."'3 Above all, this means that participants in voluntary repatriation should not return refugees if their fundamental human rights are
endangered.' States often attempt to rush refugees back home before
they meet these conditions."' The return of refugees from Haiti, 40 the
132. Id. at 447.
133. Id. at 451. See UNHCR and the Danish Ministry of the Interior, Survey of Implementation of Temporary Protection, Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in
the Former Yugoslavia, July 16, 1993.
134. UNHCR, supra note 14, at 31 (1995). In the beginning, the UNHCR's approach
continued to concentrate ... in countries of asylum: registering potential returnees, verifying that their departure was genuinely voluntary and arranging their
transport home. Once they had crossed the border into their homeland, they were
considered to be the responsibility of their own state and therefore ceased to be of
international concern.
Id. Today, the UNHCR's focus on repatriation purportedly carries the concern with containment back into the country of origin.
135. See Barry Stein & Fred Cuny, Repatriation Under Conflict, in 1991 WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY

15-21 (1991).

136. Guy Goodwin-Gill has called non-refoulement one of the "soundest rules" of the
international system for the protection of refugees. See, e.g., Goodwin-Gill, supra note 11.
137. B.S. Chimni, The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 442, 448 (1993).

138. For an application of this principle, see UNHCR

HANDBOOK, VOLUNTARY REPA-

(1996).
139. Goodwin-Gill observes that "[a]lready in western Europe, there are plenty of
documented returns of individuals to countries with a present record of extensive human
rights violations, such as Iran, Bosnia, Turkey, Algeria, Nigeria, and Zaire ....
GoodwinGill, Refuge Identity and the Fading Prospect of InternationalProtection (1996) (conference
paper on file with author).
140. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Refugee Refoulement: The Forced Return of Haitians Under the U.S. -HaitianInterdictionAgreement 58 (1990).
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Great Lakes Region, and Burma 14 are only three recent illustrations of
situations in which the international community forced
refugees home
43
before conditions had become safe for their return. 1
By failing to provide adequate protection for refugees-and, in particular, by making the conditions of temporary protection miserably
inadequate-states also indirectly send refugees home. "Why would
adequately protected and nourished refugees return home during conflict conditions to a country ruled by the government that originally
caused the flight?"' 44 The primary cause of so-called "voluntary repatriation" is the host state's unwillingness to provide for and protect
refugees.
States, the UNHCR, and other international actors work together in
the move from durable to temporary solutions. States come out as winners in the process: above all, states retain control over their borders.
For the uprooted, however, temporary protection and a quick return
home are not effective solutions by any means. Refugees forcibly returned to their homes in conflict zones in Burundi, Sudan, or Kosovo,
for example, are all likely to be confronted with threats to their fundamental human rights. By uncovering a limited yet tenacious role for the
state, the post Cold-War paradigm shift in the refugee regime does not
resolve such problems, rather this paradigm shift merely changes the
field in which human rights advocates can fashion responses.
CONCLUSION: NEW QUESTIONS

Today's refugee regime is paradoxically part of the globalization
process and an exception to this process. At first glance, the shift from a
Cold War to a post-Cold War refugee regime appears to signify a move
away from the state. The role of the state mutates and diminishes with
the entry of new non-state actors into the international arena, including
powerful NGOs. For example, states and international actors enhance
141. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Great Lakes Region Still in Need of Protection:
Repatriation, Refoulement and the Safety of Refugees and the Internally Displaced, Jan. 24,
1997, Al Index: AFR 02/07/97.
142. See K. LAMBRECHT, THE RETURN OF ROHINGYA REFUGEES TO BURMA: VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OR REFOULEMENT?

(1995).

143. See Human Rights Watch, Discussion Paper:Protection in the Decade of Voluntary Repatriation, Sept. 20, 1996; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Haitian Refoulement Case: A
Comment, 6 INT'L J. OF REFUGEE L. 103 (1994); Thomas David Jones, The HaitianRefugee
Crisis:A Questfor Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 77 (1993).
144. Barry N. Stein and Frederick C. Cuny, Repatriationin a Civil War/ConflictSituation, paper presented at Roundtable Consultation on Voluntary Repatriation and UNHCR,
Geneva, Switzerland, June 2-3, 1993, at 3.
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their willingness to work with these new actors in reaching collective
solutions. Secessionist wars break out, and states have little control over
the combatants. In addition, international bodies increase their willingness to offer aid regardless of state boundaries or state ideologies.
Nonetheless, the persistence of the statist paradigm in the asylum context casts a shadow over the possibilities for a post-Cold War refugee
regime.
Without the will of states, NGOs and collective problem-solving
can only do so much for the uprooted. States still hold the key to asylum
and to permanent, durable solutions. It only follows that states are most
often essential actors in efforts to protect the human rights of the uprooted. Yet would-be receiving states have sealed their borders shut, and
the international community, notably the UNHCR, has conspired with
states to offer "first country" resettlement, "safe areas," temporary protection, and repatriation as alternatives to asylum. For most of the
uprooted, however, such alternatives do not address their long-term
problems. The shift away from protection and asylum and toward containment and prevention re-shapes the way in which we define who is
aid-worthy. As Bill Frelick observes, "a new paradigm is emerging by
which refugee flows are prevented before asylum seekers cross an international border, the definitional trip-wire that heretofore has marked the
threshold step in the world's response to refugees."'' 45 At the same time,
the Cold War's demise has re-shaped donor states' definition of those
worthy of assistance: states are more willing to offer aid based not on
ideology, but rather on need. This need concerns their own self-interest
as well as the interests of refugees. This disturbing shift may be detrimental to the protaction and promotion of the human rights of the vast
majority of today's uprooted populations.
Within this new paradigm, transsovereign forces must find a way to
address the needs of the uprooted when states fail to do so. This means
navigating between what states are willing to give up and what they
have refused to relinquish. How can the international community turn
this situation into an opportunity for meeting refugee needs? Increased
involvement of refugee-led, non-governmental projects; enhanced participation of human rights groups in humanitarian concerns; and
enhanced work of other non-state actors are a good place to start. In developing responses we must remember that states are unlikely to give up
their hold on asylum decisions anytime soon. When do non-state actors
need to interact with states, and when can they work on their own? How
can non-state actors interact with the state to achieve their own goals?
145. Bill Frelick, Preventing Refugee Flows: Protection or Peril?, 1993 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY

5 (1993).
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These are the kinds of questions that must be considered in the new era
if the human rights of the uprooted are to be taken seriously.
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